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DEFEATING TROLLS:
THE IMPACT OF OCTANE AND HIGHMARK
ON PATENT TROLLS
Aria Soroudi*
This Comment discusses two Supreme Court cases, Octane Fitness,
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health
Management Systems, Inc., and their impact on patent litigation involving
patent trolls. Prior to these cases, patent troll litigation was on a continual
rise and Congress’s proposed measures were failing to curb the problem.
Many companies, particularly startups, were left vulnerable to a patent troll
threat because they could not afford the potential court costs to defend their
case. This problem was compounded by the fact that traditional attorney
fee shifting awards were extremely rigid and difficult to prove. This
Comment argues that Octane and Highmark are able to hinder patent troll
litigation because they reduce the standard by which attorney fees may be
awarded to the prevailing party.
Moreover, Octane and Highmark are better able to address this
problem better than other proposed and implemented solutions such as
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank and the Innovation Act. The argument is that
Octane and Highmark allow an easier award of attorney fees while
minimizing the adverse affects the other two alternatives carry. Lastly, by
implementing a mandatory bonding requirement on patent plaintiffs, the
patent troll business model will be severely impacted and result in a decline
in frivolous patent litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mention the word “troll” and what is the first thing that comes to
mind? For some, it may be images of a mythological creature that lives
under bridges and scares small children. For others however, like Google,
Apple, and Intel, a particular type of troll—”a patent troll”—is the first to
*University of Southern California undergraduate and 2016 J.D. candidate at Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles. The author would like to thank Loyola Law School Professor Cindy Archer for
her mentorship, guidance, and aid with this article, as well as the staff of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their helpful comments and review.
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come to mind. Why is this the case? These three companies have paid one
of the most infamous patent trolls in the industry, Intellectual Ventures, a
combined $6 billion in payouts and settlement fees.1 It is no wonder why
venture capitalist and PayPal co-founder, Peter Theil, has called Intellectual
Ventures a “parasitic tax on the tech industry.”2 Despite repeated efforts to
curb patent trolls, the problem continues to worsen year after year.3
On April 29, 2014, it became evident that the United States Supreme
Court was ready to put a stop to this growing problem. 4 Patent trolls, also
known as non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) 5, make the bulk of their money
by holding patents solely to license and enforce them against alleged
infringers. 6 They bring suits against both large and small companies alike. 7
For young startups, however, an action brought by a patent troll can
be devastating for the company. 8 With tight budgets, these companies do
1. Ashlee Vance, Silicon Valley’s Most Hated Patent Troll Stops Suing and Starts
Making, BUS. WK. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-0904/intellectual-ventures-patent-troll-funds-startups-new-products.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting
Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 688 (2012) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the AIA, including
the joinder provision, is to address the problem of patent trolls.”); James Bessen, Patent Trolling
Was
up
11
Percent
Last
Year,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
31,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/patent-trolling-was-up-11percent-last-year (“[In 2013], patent trolls filed 18 percent more lawsuits than in 2012, suing 11
percent more companies.”).
4. See, e.g., Judith R. Blakeway, Patent Trolls Beware: Award of Attorney’s Fees to
Prevailing Party in a Patent Case Can Be Reversed Only for Abuse of Discretion, STRASBURGER
& PRICE, LLP INTELL. PROP. BLOG (May 14, 2014), http://www.strasburger.com/patent-trollsbeware/.
5. Throughout this Note, the terms “patent troll” and “NPE” are used interchangeably.
6. Caroline Coker Coursey, Battling the Patent Troll: Tips for Defending Patent
Infringement Claims by Non-Manufacturing Patentees, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 237, 237–38
(2009) (citing Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (W.D. Wis.
2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 726 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION AND
THE SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 11–13, 17 (2013) (discussing the most pursued companies by
patent trolls and the impact of patent trolls on small businesses).
8. See John Villasenor, ‘Fee-Shifting’ and Patent Reform: A Double-Edged Sword for
(Dec.
18,
2013,
3:59
PM),
Startup
Companies,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/12/18/fee-shifting-and-patent-reform-a-doubleedged-sword-for-startup-companies/.
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not have the money or the incentive to battle patent trolls in court because
the fees themselves are enough to put the company out of business. 9 Under
the American rule, each party by default is responsible for paying its own
attorney’s fees regardless of the outcome. 10 In patent cases, only in
“exceptional cases” do courts award reasonable attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party. 11 Even then, this standard was so demanding that it
rendered Section 285 of the Patent Act “largely superfluous.” 12 However,
this Comment argues that by properly shifting attorney fees upon the
obstructive party, patent trolls will be forced to reevaluate their traditional
business practices. Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Octane Fitness,
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (“Octane”) and Highmark, Inc. v.
Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc. (“Highmark”) ultimately address
this solution by lowering the burden for the award of attorney’s fees.
Part II defines patent trolls and discusses their continual rise and the
danger they pose on the economy. Part II also discusses Congress’s failure
to adequately address the patent troll problem. Part III provides a summary
and history of attorney’s fees under Section 285 of the Patent Act prior to
the Supreme Court decisions in Octane and Highmark. Subsequently, Part
IV discusses and analyzes Octane, while Part V discusses and analyzes
Highmark. Part VI then addresses Highmark and Octane’s impact on
patent trolls. Part VII discusses the impact of other various legislative and
Supreme Court solutions to address patent trolls while also proposing a
third complimentary solution to Octane and Highmark. Lastly, Part VIII
provides a summary and conclusion of this Comment.
II. ORIGINS OF THE PATENT TROLL
A troll, a character from Norwegian folklore, is an odd name to
characterize a company that buys and enforces patents. Peter Detkin, while
assistant general counsel for Intel Corporation, first coined the phrase
“patent troll” for NPEs. 13 According to Detkin, “a patent troll is somebody
9. Id.
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d).
11. Section 285 of the Patent Act governs attorney fees. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
12. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752 (2014).
13. WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION AND THE
SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 11 (2013).

DEFEATING TROLLS (DO NOT DELETE)

322

7/2/2015 2:08 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing
and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.” 14
The problem with this business model is that it undermines the purpose for
granting patents, which is the development of new inventions.15
The limited monopoly of patents, in turn, “provides inventors with an
incentive to . . . invent, disclose, and commercialize.” 16 The most
important of these incentives is the incentive to invent. 17 A limited
monopoly on an invention allows inventors to use their monopoly “to
charge a price that more closely approaches the value that users get from
the inventions.” 18 Therefore, investors are able to recover their investment,
which ultimately provides the motivation to invent.19 Moreover, patents
incentivize inventors to commercialize the product.20 The patent gives the
inventor time to attain commercial viability for the products, allowing the
patent investors to recoup their investment. 21
The Founding Fathers also understood the importance of protecting
intellectual property by including Article I, Section 8 in the United States
Constitution, which states, “Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the
14. Id. (citing Anna Mayergoyz, Lesson from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls,
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J., 241, 245 (2009)).
15. See Brief of Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15, Highmark
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (No. 12-1163), 2013 WL
6492296, at *15 (citing Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883)) (“The design of the
patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention, which adds to
our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful arts.”).
16. Tina M. Nguyen, Note, Lowering the Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax
the Patent System, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 101, 110 (2012) (citing MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R.
RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 28, 30, 33–34 (3d ed.
2009)).
17. Id. at 111.
18. Id. (citing William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1966); John S. McGee, Patent
Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J.L. & ECON. 135, 137–39 (1966)).
19. Nguyen, supra note 16, at 111.
20. Id. (citing MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R.
AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 28, 33 (3d ed. 2009)).

RADER, & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES

21. Id. at 112 (citing MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 28, 34 (3d ed. 2009)).
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 22 Patent trolls, however, undermine patent policy goals
because they “extract all of the rights from a patent without conferring
upon society any of the benefits.” 23
A. How Patent Trolls Work
Patent trolls often acquire their patents from technology companies
that failed. 24 When a company files for bankruptcy, its patent portfolio is
sold in bankruptcy auctions, 25 allowing patent trolls to accumulate massive
portfolios. 26 Additionally, patent trolls buy patents from independent
inventors or, alternatively, search the country for patents on older
technology that might be used in modern products.27 Once acquired, patent
trolls do not produce products, but rather, identify companies in the same
industries and attempt to collect license fees or sue them for infringement. 28
What makes patent trolls extremely problematic in court is their
leverage over other product-producing companies. 29 When NPEs file a
suit, they cannot in turn be countersued for patent infringement because
they are not producing an actual product with the patent they acquired.30
Moreover, because patent trolls do not use patented inventions themselves,
the parties cannot settle with a cross-licensing agreement, which is a
common way patent infringement suits are settled between entities that use
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. Watkins, supra note 13 (citing Victoria E. Luxardo, Comment, Towards a Solution to
the Problem of Illegitimate Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable
Affirmative Defense of “Fair Use” in Patent, 20 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 791, 796 (2006)).
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 691 (2012).
30. Id.
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patented inventions. 31 This allows patent trolls to bring claims without fear
of severe backlash.
One need not look further than NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd.
to understand the damage that patent trolls can inflict. 32 NTP is a NPE,
which owns about twenty-five patents. 33 In 2001, NTP filed suit against
Research in Motion (“RIM”) alleging RIM infringed on NTP patents. 34
RIM defended its suit on the theory that NTP’s patents were too obvious to
be patentable. 35 The case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict for
NTP, awarding NTP $53 million. 36 The court also granted a permanent
injunction against RIM, which prohibited RIM from manufacturing and
selling Blackberry devices. 37 RIM appealed and the injunction was stayed
pending the decision. 38 While on appeal, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) reexamined NTP’s patents to determine
whether they were valid. 39 Eventually, the USPTO found all of NTP’s
patents were invalid. 40 NTP appealed the decision of the USPTO, further
delaying the injunction pending against RIM. 41 With the threat of an
injunction still looming, RIM decided to settle with NTP for $612.5
million. 42 Ultimately the patents were held invalid, but not after RIM paid
half a billion dollars in licensing fees.43
31. Id.
32. See generally NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
33. Watkins, supra note 13, at 21.
34. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1290.
35. Id. at 1325.
36. Id. at 1292.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Nguyen, supra note 16, at 107.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Although this case was in 2001, patent infringement lawsuits
involving NPEs have “increased dramatically over the last decade, by an
average of 22% per year since 2004.” 44 Just two years ago, “patent trolls
filed 18% more lawsuits in 2013 than in 2012, suing 11% more
companies.” 45 Of all patent lawsuits filed in 2013, approximately 52%
involved patent trolls.46
B. Major Causes of Patent Trolling
In part, the rise in NPE litigation has resulted from the USPTO itself.
In recent decades, the USPTO funding has been slashed, which has led to a
diminished examination of patent applications.47 For instance, “[b]etween
‘1983 to 2003, the number of patent applications received by the USPTO
more than tripled . . . [while] the number of examiners . . . decreased by
20%.’” 48 As a result, the USPTO approves “thousands of ambiguous [and
overbroad] patents . . . every year.” 49 These overbroad patents make it
difficult for product-producing companies to determine whether a patent’s
claims will be invalidated in litigation.50
Despite the USPTO’s faults, patent trolls are most able to thrive due
to the cost of litigation. The average legal cost to defend a patent suit
ranges from “$420,000 for small and medium-sized companies to $1.52
44. Litigations Over Time, PATENT FREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/aboutnpes/litigations/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) (emphasis added).
45. James Bessen, Patent Trolling Was Up 11 Percent Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 31,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/patent-trolling-was-up11-percent-last-year.
46. Id.
47. Ashley Chuang, Note, Fixing the Failures of Software Patent Protection: Deterring
Patent Trolling by Applying Industry-Specific Patentability Standards, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
215, 227 (2006).
48. Id. at 227–28 (“In 2004, nearly 118,000 patent applications previously reviewed by
the USPTO were resubmitted as new applications with only minor changes, thus ‘wast[ing] the
limited time examiners have to review an application and prevent[ing] examiners from focusing
on the most important issues in an application.’ Further, of the 355,000 new applications filed in
2004, over forty percent of them had more than twenty claims each.”).
49. Id. at 228 (“[O]n appeal, examiner decisions are commonly reversed and
overturned.”).
50. Id.
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million for large companies.” 51 Because many small companies have no
other business alternatives and cannot afford the risks and costs of
litigation, they are forced to settle for needless licenses. 52 Patent trolls
know this and exploit these small companies for a quick profit.
C. The Dangers of Patent Trolls
Some see the rise in patent litigation involving patent trolls as
beneficial, contending that trolls fight large companies otherwise held
unaccountable for infringement due to smaller companies’ inability to
afford the costs of going to court. 53 “Trolls fight for the rights of the little
guy . . . [b]y purchasing the patent [and] infus[ing] capital into small
business that can in turn focus on more R&D. NPEs assume the risk of
enforcing patents, and inventors can focus on inventing.” 54
While patent trolls may partly inject capital into small businesses,
they also exact a severe toll on the economy and innovation. It is estimated
that from 1990 through October 2010, “NPE lawsuits ‘[were] responsible
for over half a trillion dollars in lost wealth.’” 55 This loss even caught the
attention of President Obama, and the White House’s Council of Economic
Advisors released a report, “Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation,” finding
that defendants and licensees paid patent trolls “$29 billion in 2011, a
400% increase from 2005.” 56 The report further “estimated that less than
25% of this money flowed back to innovation.” 57 From 2007 through
October 2010, patent lawsuits reduced the capitalization of targeted firms
by an estimated $83 billion per year, which is equal to more than one-

51. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 400 (2014).
52. Matthew Shay, Time to Demand an End to Abusive Patent Troll Tactics, THE HILL
(Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/190779-timeto-demand-an-end-to-abusive-patent-troll-tactics.
53. Watkins, supra note 13, at 16.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 9
(2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
57. Id. at 9.
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quarter of U.S. industrial research and development spending per year. 58
This lost wealth results in less spending on innovative technology for
companies at the forefront of technological innovation.
The damage to small startups, however, is even more severe. The
White House Report found that “[i]n a recent survey of 223 technology
company startups, 40 percent of [patent assertion entity]-targeted
companies reported a ‘significant’ operational impact (e.g. change in
business, delay in milestone, change in product, etc.) due to the suit or
threat thereof,” 59 and 13% were forced to exit the business or pivot their
business strategy. 60
There are also social costs to patent troll litigation. With over half of
patent litigation brought by patent trolls, it could clog up already busy
courtrooms and use resources that could be used for other cases. Where
product-producing companies that bring patent infringement suits win 40%
of their cases, patent trolls win only 8% of their suits. 61 Therefore, patent
trolls exhaust more patent litigation resources while proving to be less
successful than product-producing entities. 62 This comes at the cost of the
taxpayers because their tax dollars are spent to support the court’s
resources. 63
D. Congress’s Failed Solutions to Curb Patent Trolls
With the rise of patent litigation, Congress started to take notice. In
2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act. 64 The Act was predicted
to curb the patent troll problem by limiting joinder of multiple defendants
in patent litigation. 65 However, with patent litigation involving patent trolls
58. Watkins, supra note 13, at 17.
59. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 56, at 10.
60. Id. at 11.
61. Bryant, supra note 29, at 693.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 688.
64. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
65. Bryant, supra note 29, at 689 (“[T]he purpose of the [act] was to abrogate case law
that allowed joinder of defendants simply because the plaintiff claimed that they had infringed the
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still on the rise, 66 it was apparent that further measures were needed.
Over the course of two years, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
pushed Congress to make reforms to reign in patent trolls. 67 Congress
finally responded in 2012 when Congressman Peter DeFazio introduced the
SHIELD Act in the House of Representatives. 68 The act involved shifting
attorney’s fees in “computer hardware and software” patents where the
patentee “did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding.”69 Although
the SHIELD Act of 2012 failed to pass, it was reworked and re-introduced
as the SHIELD Act of 2013. 70 The SHIELD Act of 2013 attempted to
“[shift] fees against any party that is not: (1) the original inventor or
assignee; (2) exploiting the patent commercially through sale or production
of items practicing the patent; or (3) a university or technology transfer
organization.” 71
The Act raises an issue, however, because courts may find it difficult
to assess whether the losing party falls into the “exploitation of the patent”
category. 72 By presumptively shifting fees to the losing party, there is no
determination as to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. 73 Therefore, the Act
essentially presumes that the losing party’s claim is frivolous. This may in
turn deter small companies from filing legitimate claims. Therefore,
Congress’s proposed SHIELD Act does not seem to properly remedy
patent litigation abuse.
Another bill, known as the Innovation Act, seemed to show more
same patent.”).
66. Id. at 687.
67. Daniel Nazer, Patent Reform Stalls in Congress As Trolls Roll On, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (May 15, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/patent-reform-stalls-congresstrolls-roll.
68. Id.
69. Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH.
59, 109 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 112.
71. Id.
72. Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting
Attorneys' Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 377 (2013).
73. See id.
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promise. Much like the SHIELD Act, the Innovation Act seeks to reduce
the cost and frequency of patent litigation by shifting fees.74 However, the
Innovation Act awards attorney’s fees to the losing party by default.75 The
House of Representatives passed the Innovation Act in December 2013 by
a staggering margin of 325 to 91, showing apparent signs of progress.76 In
May 2014, however, the Innovation Act was dealt a crucial blow.77
Senator Patrick Leahy pulled it from the Judiciary Committee agenda,
stating that “competing companies on both sides of [the] issue refused to
come to agreement.” 78 The bill has been repeatedly postponed,79 and it
seems Congress has failed once again to curb the problem.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PATENT ACT’S FEE SHIFTING PROVISION
The Patent Act of 1952 is the current law governing patents in the
United States. 80 The Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.” 81 To
obtain a patent, an inventor must submit an application to the USPTO.82
An examiner approves and issues a patent, which generally remains valid
for twenty years. 83 Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not authorize the
74. Liang & Berliner, supra note 69, at 124.
75. Michael Rosen, Thwarting ‘Patent Trolls’: Not as Easy as It Sounds, AM. ENTER.
INST. (June 10, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://www.aei.org/publication/thwarting-patent-trolls-not-aseasy-as-it-sounds/print/.
76. Klint Finley, U.S. Senate Drives a Stake Through Heart of Patent Reform, WIRED
(May 21, 2014, 8:53 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/05/rip-innovation-act/.
77. Kelly Servick, U.S. Senate Shelves Long-Debated ‘Patent Troll’ Bill, SCI. MAG. (May
22, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/policy/2014/05/u.s.-senate-shelves-long-debatedpatent-troll-bill.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
81. Id.
82. General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patentsgetting-started/general-information-concerning-patents (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
83. Id.
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awarding of attorney’s fees under any circumstances. 84 Instead, the Act
followed the default American Rule under which both sides must bear its
own attorney’s fees. 85
In 1946, Congress introduced a discretionary fee-shifting provision,
which stated that a court, “may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any patent
case.” 86 In granting this power, the legislature made clear that the court
should not award fees in patent cases as a matter of course.87 The payment
of attorney’s fees was not seen as a penalty for failure to win, but rather,
“was designed to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer.” 88 Also,
“fraud practiced on the Patent Office or vexatious or unjustified litigation
are adequate justification for awarding attorneys’ fees.” 89
In 1952, Congress re-codified the fee-shifting provision under the
current Section 285. 90 The revised provision provides: “[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.” 91 Although Section 285 introduced the words “exceptional
cases,” 92 the revised language was “for purposes of clarification only.” 93
As such, the courts continued to apply the fee-shifting provision in a
discretionary manner, looking at the totality of the circumstances.94
Courts used several factors to determine whether a given case was
84. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014).
85. Id.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946).
87. Pa. Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d 445, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1951).
88. Id. at 451.
89. Id.
90. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753.
91. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952) (emphasis added).
92. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2423 (“This
section is substantially the same as the corresponding provision in R.S. 4921; ‘in exceptional
cases’ has been added as expressing the intention of the present statute as shown by its legislative
history and as interpreted by the courts.”).
93. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 n.8 (1983).
94. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753.
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sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant attorney fees.95 One such factor was
the plaintiff’s motive in bringing the patent suit. 96 Therefore, if the
plaintiff was aware that the patent was invalid at the time of the suit, then
the court may deem the case exceptional.97 Another factor was whether the
tactics employed by the plaintiff in maintaining his suit justify an award of
attorney fees. 98 For example, if the litigation is needlessly protracted, it
may be deemed exceptional.99 The most important factor, this Comment
argues, is the patentee’s conduct in originally obtaining his patent, “since
fraud on the Patent Office in that endeavor is enough itself to make a case
exceptional.” 100 In Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Co., the court explained that:
Such conduct is a serious breach of the patentee’s duty to
the Patent Office. The party who succeeds in invalidating
the unlawful patent performs a valuable public service. It
is appropriate under such circumstances to reward the
prevailing party by giving him attorney’s fees for his
efforts, and it is equally appropriate to penalize in the same
measure the patentee who obtained the patent by his
wrongdoing. 101
In 1982, Congress vested the United States Court of Appeals for the

95. True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 508 (10th Cir. 1979).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288,
294 (9th Cir. 1969) (citations omitted) (“The District Court found that Monolith had made
fraudulent representations to the Patent Office in four respects: (1) deliberate concealment of
statutory bars; (2) falsehoods in a petition to make special; (3) misrepresentations about
‘unexpected results’; and (4) false statements of novelty in an affidavit by one Oscar Wicken
procured by Monolith and filed in the Patent Office. Monolith argues that each of those findings
is clearly erroneous. We examine the findings seriatim.”).
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Federal Circuit with sole appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.102 Like
the regional courts before, the Federal Circuit continued to consider the
totality of the circumstances and various factors to assess whether a patent
case was exceptional. 103
In 2005, however, the Federal Circuit, in Brooks Furniture
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc. unexpectedly
abandoned this discretionary and “equitable approach.” 104 The court in
Brooks held that a case is exceptional under Section 285 only “when there
has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in
litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in
procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified
litigation, conduct that violates [Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure], or like infractions.” 105 Additionally, “[a]bsent misconduct in
conduct of the litigation or in securing the patent, sanctions may be
imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in
subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” 106
Further, the court in Brooks held “[t]here is a presumption that the assertion
of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith” 107 and the
“underlying improper conduct and the characterization of the case as
exceptional must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” 108
Expanding on the issue, the Federal Circuit in iLOR, LLC v. Google,
Inc. made clear that litigation is objectively baseless if it is “so
unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed.”109

102. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754.
103. Id.; see also Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In assessing whether a case qualifies as exceptional, the district court
must look at the totality of the circumstances.”).
104. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754 (citing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.,
393 F.3d 1378, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
105. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1382.
108. Id.
109. iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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It comes as no coincidence that following the decision in Brooks, the
number of frivolous patent suits brought by patent trolls has risen
astronomically. 110 However, two Supreme Court cases, Highmark and
Octane, have set out to slay patent trolls once and for all.
IV. OCTANE FITNESS, LLC V. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (“ICON”) is a manufacturer of exercise
equipment and owns U.S Patent No. 6,019,710 (“Patent 710”) for an
elliptical exercise machine.111 Although ICON owns Patent 710, it never
produced or commercially sold the design. 112 The defendant, Octane
Fitness, LLC, (“Octane”) is also a manufacturer of exercise equipment and
commercially sells two elliptical machines known as the Q45 and Q47. 113
In 2011, ICON sued Octane, alleging that Octane’s Q45 and Q47 elliptical
machines infringed on Patent 710.114 Octane denied the infringement and
moved for summary judgment declaring non-infringement. 115 The district
court granted Octane’s motion, concluding that the Q45 and Q47 elliptical
machines did not infringe on ICON’s Patent 710. 116 Octane then moved for
attorney’s fees under Section 285 arguing that ICON’s “unreasonable claim
construction positions,” and its “privilege assertions over its pre-suit
investigation” were made in bad faith.117 Further, during discovery, Octane
110. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. in Support of Pet’r at 10,
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 2013
WL 6512960, at *10 (“PAEs accounted for only about five percent of patent litigation in 20002002 . . . This figure increased to about 22 percent in 2007, and then to almost 40 percent in
2011.”).
111. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2014)
(“[t]he respondent, ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., owns U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 ([]710 patent),
which discloses an elliptical exercise machine that allows for adjustments to fit the individual
stride paths of users.”).
112. Id. at 1755.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x. 57, 65 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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obtained emails from ICON’s Vice President of Global Sales that were sent
to two other employees, stating “[the] old patent we had for a long time that
was sitting on the shelf. 118 [We] are just looking for royalties.” 119 The “old
patent” from the email referred to Patent 710. 120 However, the district
court denied Octane’s motion, determining that “Octane could show neither
that ICON’s claim was objectively baseless nor that ICON had brought it in
subjective bad faith.” 121 Furthermore, “[t]he fact that [ICON] is a bigger
company which never commercialized [Patent 710], and [this was] an email exchange between two ICON sales executives,” was insufficient to
show that ICON brought the suit in bad faith. 122
ICON appealed the non-infringement judgment and Octane crossappealed the denial of Section 285 attorney fees.123 Specifically, Octane
argued that the Brooks standard was “overly restrictive” in finding a case
exceptional under Section 285. 124 However, the Federal Circuit affirmed
both district court orders and declined to “revisit the settled standard for
exceptionality.” 125 Octane again appealed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 126 After almost seven months, the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit decision and overturned the framework established by
Brooks, finding that Brooks was “unduly rigid, and it impermissibly

118. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319 ADM/SER, 2011
WL 3900975, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011) (“[A]n Icon employee with the title of Vice
President of Global Sales reported to two other employees, ‘We are suing Octane. Not only are
we coming out with a great product to go after them, but throwing a lawsuit on top of that.’”).
119. Id.
120. See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754.
121. Id. at 1755.
122. Id. (quoting ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319
ADM/SER, 2011 WL 3900975, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x. 57,
67 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. (quoting ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x. 57,
67 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755.
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encumber[ed] the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”127 In its
place, the Supreme Court held “[d]istrict courts may determine whether a
case is exceptional in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion,
considering the totality of the circumstances.” 128 Moreover, “[a]s in the
comparable context of the Copyright Act, there is no precise rule or
formula for making these determinations, but instead equitable discretion
should be exercised in light of the considerations.” 129
The Court’s reasoning behind this change started with an analysis of
the text of Section 285 itself. 130 Because the Patent Act did not define the
term “exceptional,” the Court construed it in “accordance with [its]
ordinary meaning.” 131 As such, the Supreme Court took “exceptional” to
mean “uncommon, rare, or not ordinary.” 132 Therefore, the Supreme Court
held that an exceptional case is “simply one that stands out from others
with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position
(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”133
Another reason for the change in the rule was partly because the
Brooks standard “superimpose[d] an inflexible framework onto statutory
text that [was] inherently flexible.” 134 Previously, courts applying the
Brooks standard would allow attorney’s fees where the litigation
misconduct was independently sanctionable or the litigation was both
objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith. 135 The Court in
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1756.
129. Id. (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
130. Id. at 1755.
131. Id. at 1756 (quoting Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013)); see also Bilski
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“In patent law, as in
all statutory construction, [u]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”).
132. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 889 (2d ed.
1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1756–57.
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Octane, however, made clear that a party’s unreasonable conduct, although
not independently sanctionable, can still justify an award of attorney
fees. 136 Moreover, the requirement that the litigation be both objectively
baseless and brought in subjective bad faith was not Congress’ intent when
it drafted the “exceptional” language. 137 Rather, “a case presenting either
subjective bad faith or exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently . . .
warrant a fee award.” 138
In its brief to the Supreme Court, ICON argued that the Brooks
standard was properly adopted in another Supreme Court decision,
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc. (hereinafter “PRE”). 139 In PRE, the Court considered when the First
Amendment provides immunity from antitrust liability for litigation
activity. 140 The Court held “the plaintiff must have brought baseless claims
in an attempt to thwart competition (i.e., in bad faith).” 141 The Supreme
Court in Octane, however, found that the adoption of the PRE standard in
Brooks made little sense in the context of Section 285 fee awards.142 The
Court in PRE “carved out . . . a narrow exception . . . to avoid chilling the
exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the government for the
redress of grievances.” 143 The PRE court’s “demanding standard reflects
both the important First Amendment interests at stake in petitioning the
government . . . and the distinct chilling effect of treble damages.” 144
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1757.
138. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757.
139. Id.
140. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
56 (1993).
141. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; see also id. at 60–61(internal quotation marks omitted)
(holding that to qualify as a “sham” a “lawsuit must be objectively baseless” and must conceal
“an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor”).
142. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757.
143. Id.
144. Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 12,
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (No. 12-1163), Octane
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 2013
WL 6492299.
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However, Section 285 of the Patent Act does not raise any of these First
Amendment concerns. 145 Therefore, narrowly construing the shifting of
attorney’s fees in Brooks was improper. 146
Another reason for the Court’s rejection of Brooks was that it
rendered Section 285 “largely superfluous.” 147 The courts have recognized
that litigating in bad faith is a sufficient basis for awarding attorney’s fees
under the common law. 148 This common law rule existed, as it does today,
at the time Congress enacted Section 285. 149 Therefore, if Brooks were
correct and Section 285 required a subjective bad faith showing, Section
285 “would have had no effect: fee-shifting would be limited to the same
category of cases in which it was available before the statute was
enacted.” 150
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Octane rejected the Brooks standard
because of the requirement that entitlement to fees under Section 285 be
established by clear and convincing evidence. 151 At no time before Brooks
did the Supreme Court require entitlement to fees by clear and convincing
evidence. 152 Rather, “patent-infringement litigation ha[d] always been
145. See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; see also Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. Nat’l Elec.
Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 373 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument that the NoerrPennington doctrine places limits on fee-shifting).
146. See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier
Foundation, et al. in Support of Pet’r at 10, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 2013 WL 6512960, at *7.
147. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758; see also Brief of Pet’r at 7, Octane, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (No.
12-1184) (“[T]he Federal Circuit's interpretation also makes it superfluous.”).
148. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“We have long
recognized a common-law exception to the general American rule against fee-shifting—an
exception . . . that applies for willful disobedience of a court order or when the losing party has
acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .”).
149. Brief of BSA | The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
14, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184),
2013 WL 6492300, at *14.
150. Id. at 14–15; see also Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (“We have twice declined to
construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly on the basis that doing so would render them
superfluous, given the background exception to the American rule . . . .”).
151. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.
152. Id.
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governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard.” 153 For the
foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court rejected Brooks and re-established
the long held standard of totality of the circumstances when determining
attorney fees. 154
V. HIGHMARK INC. V.
ALLCARE HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC.
Allcare is a Virginia-based company that licenses intellectual property
assets. 155 Among its assets is U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105 (“105 patent”),
which covers “utilization review in managed health care systems.” 156 Like
other patent trolls, Allcare conducted a survey of various healthcare
management and insurance companies in order to find potential targets to
collect fees. 157 From this survey, Allcare filed suit against twenty-four
companies, including Highmark, claiming that the companies’ management
systems infringed the 105 patent. 158 In April 2002, Allcare sent Highmark
a letter demanding that Highmark purchase a license to the 105 patent or
else face potential litigation. 159 Allcare then sent additional letters to
Highmark, threatening litigation and warning Highmark of the high costs of
litigation. 160
After failed discussions between the parties, Highmark filed suit
against Allcare seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
invalidity, and unenforceability of all claims of the 105 patent.161 Allcare

153. Id.
154. See generally Octane, 134 S. Ct. 1749.
155. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716 (N.D.
Tex. 2010).
156. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Highmark, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747.
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counterclaimed for patent infringement. 162 Both Highmark and Allcare
then moved for summary judgment. 163 The district court granted summary
judgment of non-infringement in favor of Highmark, and Allcare
appealed. 164 While the appeal was pending, Highmark moved for
attorney’s fees under Section 285. 165 The district court granted Highmark’s
Section 285 motion, finding that Allcare “engaged in a pattern of
‘vexatious’ and ‘deceitful’ conduct throughout the litigation.” 166
Particularly, the district court found that “Allcare had ‘pursued [the] suit as
part of a bigger plan to identify companies potentially infringing the 105
patent . . . and then to force those companies to purchase a license of the
105 patent under threat of litigation.’” 167 Moreover, “Allcare had
‘maintained infringement claims [against Highmark] well after such claims
had been shown by its own experts to be without merit’ and had ‘asserted
defenses it and its attorneys knew to be frivolous.’” 168
On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed in part and affirmed in part.169 The court affirmed “the
exceptional-case determination with respect to the allegations that
Highmark’s system infringed one claim of the 105 patent, but reversed the
determination with respect to another claim of the patent.” 170 The court
then reviewed the district court’s determination de novo 171 and held that
“because the question whether litigation is ‘objectively baseless’ under
Brooks . . . ‘is a question of law based on underlying mixed questions of
law and fact,’ an objective-baselessness determination is reviewed on
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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appeal ‘de novo’ and ‘without deference.’” 172 It then determined that
Allcare’s claim was “not so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could
believe it would succeed,” and therefore held that none of Allcare’s
conduct warranted Section 285 attorney’s fees under Brooks. 173 Judge
Mayer, however, dissented to the court’s decision to adopt a “de novo”
standard. 174 Despite the dissent of five judges, the Federal Circuit denied a
rehearing en banc. 175 The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari.176
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal
Circuit’s decision, holding that “an appellate court should apply an abuse
of discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s Section
285 determination.” 177 The Court reasoned that “decisions on ‘questions of
law’ are ‘reviewable de novo,’ decisions on ‘questions of fact’ are
‘reviewable for clear error,’ and decisions on ‘matters of discretion’ are
‘reviewable for abuse of discretion.’” 178 Because the district’s court’s
determination to award Section 285 attorney’s fees was a matter of
discretion, it should have been reviewed only for abuse of discretion. 179
VI. THE IMPACT OF HIGHMARK AND OCTANE
After the decisions in Highmark and Octane, many commentators
wonder about their immediate impacts and consequences in the patent

172. Id.
173. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747–48.
174. Id. (Judge Mayer dissented in part, disagreeing with the view “‘that no deference is
owed to a district court’s finding that the infringement claims asserted by a litigant at trial were
objectively unreasonable.’”).
175. Id. at 1748.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 1749.
178. Id. at 1748; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988) (“We
recently observed, with regard to the problem of determining whether mixed questions of law and
fact are to be treated as questions of law or of fact for purposes of appellate review, that
sometimes the decision ‘has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question.’”) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
179. See Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748.
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field. 180 Standing together, it is clear the decisions make it easier for
district court judges to award attorney’s fees in patent cases. 181 In Octane,
the standard for Section 285 attorney’s fees was restored to its original,
intended standard, making it easier for courts to weed out frivolous cases
brought by patent trolls.182 Moreover, the decision in Highmark places
patent law more in sync with other areas of law.183 The Federal Circuit will
now be required to allow the district court’s decision to stand unless it is
shown on appeal that the district court judge abused his or her discretion.
This is a high standard that will typically prevent the Federal Circuit from
reversing the district court’s decision in most cases. 184 Ultimately, with
lowered standards, patent trolls will now have to think twice before
bringing a costly infringement suit against innovative companies, knowing
they may have to pay the attorney’s fees.
The impact of Octane and Highmark are already being felt. Just one
month after the rulings in Octane and Highmark, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York awarded attorney fees to
FindTheBest.com (“FTB”) in a prolonged suit with Lumen View
Technology. 185 Judge Cote, who oversaw the trial, explained that
“Lumen’s motivation . . . was to extract a nuisance settlement . . . from
FTB on the theory that FTB would rather pay an unjustified license fee
than bear the costs of the threatened expensive litigation.” 186 On these
grounds, Section 285 attorney’s fees were justified.187 Moreover, since the
180. See generally Rich Steeves, Octane, Highmark Cases to Impact Future of Fee
Shifting, INSIDE COUNSEL (May 1, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/05/01/octanehighmark-cases-to-impact-future-of-fee-shif (asking the practical impact of Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) to fee shifting in patent cases).
181. Id.
182. See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014).
183. See generally Judith R. Blakeway, Patent Trolls Beware, STRASBURGER BLOGS
(May 14, 2014), http://www.strasburger.com/patent-trolls-beware (demonstrating that courts have
become more in sync with each other in terms of patent standards of review).
184. See id.
185. John F. O’Rourke, Patrick Soon & Rebecca Bellow, Silver, Garlic, and Attorney’s
COUNTY
LAWYER
(Oct.
2014),
available
at
Fees,
ORANGE
http://www.whglawfirm.com/SILVER-GARLIC-AND-ATTORNEY-S-FEES.pdf.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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decisions, 101 district courts have cited Octane. 188 This is a testament to
the impact these two Supreme Court decisions are making in patent law.
Highmark and Octane are not only impacting the patent world, but are
impacting trademark law as well.189 In a Third Circuit case, Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, the court determined that Octane’s ruling on
awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases should apply equally to trademark
cases under the Lanham Act. 190 Traditionally, the Third Circuit has utilized
a two-step approach, much like the Brooks standard, that required (1) a
finding of culpable conduct, and (2) an assessment that that conduct is
extraordinary before assessing attorney’s fees in trademark suits. 191 In
holding that the test no longer applies, the Third Circuit noted the Supreme
Court “was sending a clear message that it was defining ‘exceptional’ not
just for the fee provision in the Patent Act, but for the fee provision in the
Lanham Act as well.” 192 Not only is the language in the Lanham Act’s
attorney’s fee provision very similar to that in Section 285, the Supreme
Court in Octane cited a Lanham Act case when defining “exceptional.” 193
Despite the visible impact of these cases in the patent field, many
doubt whether Highmark and Octane will actually be the dagger in the
heart for patent trolls.194 One such argument contends that Highmark and
Octane will not likely impact patent trolls because the “business model for
many trolls is only based on threatening to bring lawsuits as a tactic for
forcing settlements rather than actually bringing law suits.”195 Given that
attorney’s fees are not awarded when a matter is settled, patent trolls will

188. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).
189. See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2014).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 315.
193. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (citing Noxel Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-One
Restaurant, 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
194. See,e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Potential Unintended Consequences of
Fee Shifting After the Supreme Court Decisions in Octane Fitness and Highmark, JHTL (Apr. 30,
2014), http://jhtlblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/30/the-potential-unintended-consequences-of-feeshifting-after-the-supreme-court-decisions-in-octane-fitness-and-highmark/.
195. Id.
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continue to exploit small and large companies alike.196 This argument has
its merits given that 97% of patent claims settle before they even reach
trial. 197 However, this argument fails to take into account the inherent
business model of these patent trolls, which is to threaten costly litigation
knowing that settling is a cheaper option than paying attorney’s fees. 198
With the decisions in Highmark and Octane, the patent troll business model
has changed because product-producing companies now know that the
other side will likely bear the cost of their attorney fees. 199 With this
knowledge, companies will have the confidence to stand up to patent trolls
and not compromise on settlements.
Lumen View Technology, LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc. is the perfect
example. 200 There, the company’s CEO, Kevin O’Connor, vowed to fight
back rather than pay the $50,000 licensing fee Lumen (the NPE) was
demanding. 201 The company quickly defeated the claim in court and FTB
was awarded $200,000 in attorney fees. 202 O’Connor said he hoped “other
companies [will] see this as a sign that settling isn’t the only way out.” 203
Ultimately, empirical evidence supports the proposition that
Highmark and Octane are starting to curb patent litigation involving NPEs.
According to data from Lex Machina, there has been a sharp decline in the
number of patent litigation filings since May 2014. 204 There were just 387
196. See id.
197. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, How to Know a Patent Troll When You
See One? You Can’t, TIME (July 8, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/07/08/how-to-know-apatent-troll-when-you-see-one-you-cant/.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See generally Lumen View Tech., LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 329
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
201. Joe Mullin, Payback Time: First Patent Troll Ordered to Pay “Extraordinary Case”
Fees, ARS TECHNICA (June 1, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/itspayback-time-as-findthebest-wrests-legal-fees-from-patent-troll.
202. See Lumen View Tech, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 337 (“The question of whether this cased is
exceptional is not close, and fee shifting in this case will ‘serve as an instrument of justice.’”);
O’Rourke et al., supra note 185.
203. Mullin, supra note 201.
204. September 2014 New Patent Case Filings Down 40% From September 2013, LEX
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new cases in May 2014 compared to 502 cases in May 2013, which
roughly amounts to a 23% decrease. 205 It is no coincidence that Octane
and Highmark were both decided in late April 2014. Even more staggering
is that just 329 patent suits were filed in September 2014 compared to 549
patent filings in September 2013, which is roughly a 40% decrease.206 This
strong correlation indicates that Octane and Highmark are likely beginning
to impact the patent trolls’ business model.
VII. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
While there are emerging signs of improvement in patent troll abuse,
there is always more to be done. Even with great victories in Octane and
Highmark, the war itself is still not over. So what more can be done? One
proffered solution is the previously discussed Innovation Act.207 Another
alternative, which has already been implemented, involves the recent
Supreme Court decision, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
International. 208 With these proposed and implemented solutions in
motion, this Comment argues that while the Innovation Act and Alice Corp.
will benefit patent holders in theory, they carry grave consequences that
outweigh their inherent benefits. As a result, a bonding requirement is
actually the best solution to put the patent troll to rest.
A. The Consequences of the Innovation Act
Like Octane, the Innovation Act addresses fee-shifting provisions in
patent cases. Unlike Octane, however, the Innovation Act would
automatically require the losing party to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees
instead of an award of fees only in exceptional cases. 209 Each side bears its
own attorney’s fees only if the court finds that the non-prevailing party was
MACHINA (Oct. 8, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/2014/10/september-2014-new-patent-casefilings-40-september-2013/.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 59, 124 (2013).
208. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
209. Liang & Berliner, supra note 207, at 125.
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“‘substantially justified’ or that special circumstances make an award
unjust.” 210 This of course is contrary to the established American Rule, and
instead aligns itself with the “loser-pays” English rule. 211 Under the
Innovation Act, many perceive that there will be a reduction in the number
of cases filed, even more so than with awards under Section 285.212 One of
the effects of this method is that contingency fee plaintiff’s attorneys will
suffer a significant loss in the form of the other party’s attorney’s fees if
they are unsuccessful in court.213 Because many patent trolls use
contingency fee arrangements, their attorneys will be discouraged from
representing them, knowing the potential for additional, substantial costs.
Therefore, there would likely be a reduction in the number of NPE claims
filed. A “loser-pays” system adopted by the Innovation Act would also
discourage low-merit, high-damage cases. 214 Patent trolls are notorious for
bringing dubious and vague claims, as is evidenced by their 8% success
rate at trial.215
Despite the positive aspects of the Innovation Act, the consequences
of adopting such a measure are severe. One of the dangers associated with
a loser pays system is that it also impacts patent companies that initiate
litigation in good faith, not just NPEs. 216 For small innovators, there will
be a reluctance to file a legitimate claim “because they will fear that they
will lose a lawsuit and end up paying exorbitant costs of the people who

210. Id.
211. See Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee
Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 36 (1996) (“In most European countries, civil
litigation follows the general rule that the losing party pays the winning party’s attorney’s fees, a
practice that is loosely referred to as the “‘European Rule.’”).
212. See Liang & Berliner, supra note 207, at 90 (explaining the “British Rule, or twoway fee shifting, as more effective than the American Rule at reducing the number and cost of
cases filed.”).
213. Id. at 93.
214. Id.
215. Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 693 (2012).
216. John Villasenor, ‘Fee-Shifting’ And Patent Reform: A Double-Edged Sword For
(Dec.
18,
2013),
Startup Companies,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/12/18/fee-shifting-and-patent-reform-a-doubleedged-sword-for-startup-companies/.
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they litigated against, even though their claim was legitimate.” 217 This
leaves large patent holders at a substantial advantage in a dispute because
they are likely to ignore the small company’s claim and increase their
attorney fees, knowing that the smaller company cannot afford the costs of
litigation that does not go their way. 218
For an example, take FTB’s CEO Kevin O’Connor, only this time
imagine he is suing a large corporation, such as Apple, for infringing
several of FTB’s patents. FTB engages in discussions with the goal of
having Apple obtain a licensing agreement to use his patents. Apple,
however, would most likely ignore his claim because Apple knows that the
fee-shifting exposure for FTB would devastate the company. A loss for
Apple, however, would only cause a small dent in the company’s massive
assets. It seems, though, that if FTB has such a strong claim, he should still
pursue it against Apple.
In patent cases, however, the “winners” and “losers” are difficult to
discern because the merits are not so clear.219 Patent litigation involves
complex technical and legal issues that are often decided by judges and
juries with minimal knowledge of patent law. 220 Moreover, patent laws are
“slow to adapt to new technologies that present new fact patterns, which
adds further uncertainty as to the merits of a patent case.” 221 Due to this
uncertainty, federal appellate courts reverse the district court’s decisions at
a rate of approximately 30%-40%. 222 This situation would not bode well
for FTB because there is a considerable chance the suit will be wrongly
decided and fees shifted onto the wrong party.
Some may argue this situation is unlikely to occur, however, because
attorney’s fees will not be awarded if the non-prevailing party was
“substantially justified” in bringing the claim. Congress, however, has
repeatedly failed to adequately define the standard when it was first applied

217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Liang & Berliner, supra note 207, at 94.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 95.
222. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation,
64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 349 (2012).
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in the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980. 223 Courts “found it extremely
difficult to provide any meaningful content for the ‘substantially justified’
standard that governs fee-shifting under the Act.” 224 The Innovation Act
adopts this same standard that Congress has yet to properly define. 225 This
vagueness of the “substantial justification” standard has led to inconsistent
decisions in the courts, which has made the award of attorney’s fees the
standard rather than the exception.226 Because a large portion of patent
plaintiffs have “substantial justification” for bringing their case and the
complexity of technologies in many patent cases, disputes over whether a
case is “substantially justified” will likely increase litigation costs, which is
contrary to the Innovation Act’s ultimate goal.227
The Patent Act’s Section 285 attorney’s fees, as governed by
Highmark and Octane, is ultimately a better solution than the Innovation
Act because Section 285 emphasizes the substance of the infringement
claim rather than focusing on the winners and losers of the case. 228
Determining whether a claim is frivolous involves addressing the lack of
merit, not necessarily who prevailed, and “attempts to single out a class of
patent owners will devalue patents, reduce the ability of patent owners to
realize a return on their investment, and ultimately decrease the incentives
to innovate.” 229 Therefore, Section 285 under Octane and Highmark is a
better solution because it addresses the merits of the claim itself, while
maintaining an even playing field between big and small innovators.

223. Niki Kuckes, Reenacting the Equal Access to Justice Act: A Proposal for Automatic
Attorney’s Fee Awards, 94 YALE L.J. 1207, 1210-11 (1985) (“The term is not a carefully crafted
term of art, but rather a conscious legislative compromise, designed as an ‘acceptable middle
ground’ between automatic fee-shifting and the bad faith standard advocated by the Executive.”).
224. Id. at 1210.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. Liang & Berliner, supra note 207, at 125.
228. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952).
229. Daniel Roth, Patent Litigation Attorneys’ Fees: Shifting from Status to Conduct, 13
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 257, 272 (2013) (concluding that “all entities that assert claims of
patent infringement should be held to the same standard of conduct.”).
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B. The Unintended Consequences of Alice Corp.
Many argue that the recent Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp.
Pty. v. CLS Bank International presents another, more effective solution to
the patent troll problem than that offered in Octane and Highmark. 230 In
Alice Corp., the Supreme Court addressed the main issue of whether
“computer-implemented” inventions “are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. §
101, or are instead drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.” 231 Alice
Corporation was the holder of several patents, one of which included a
computer-implemented scheme for mitigating settlement risk. 232 CLS
Bank was an operator of a global network that facilitates currency
transactions. 233 CLS Bank filed suit against Alice Corp., seeking a
declaratory judgment that the computer-implemented scheme patent was
invalid. 234 Alice Corp. counterclaimed, alleging infringement by CLS
Bank. 235 Ultimately the court held that “the claims at issue [were] drawn to
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement,” and that “merely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation fail[ed] to transform that abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention.” 236
The holding in Alice Corp. discourages patent trolls from filing
claims because it changes the underlying conditions of their business
model. 237 Patent trolls thrive in the software sector because their patents

230. See generally Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347.
231. Id. at 2352.
232. Id. at 2353 (explaining that the “patents in suit claim (1) the foregoing method for
exchanging obligations (the method claims), (2) a computer system configured to carry out the
method for exchanging obligations (the system claims), and (3) a computer-readable medium
containing program code for performing the method of exchanging obligations (the media
claims). All of the claims are implemented using a computer; the system and media claims
expressly recite a computer, and the parties have stipulated that the method claims require a
computer as well.”).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 2357.
237. See id. at 2354.
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involve software patents of dubious quality. 238 With the ruling in Alice
Corp., parties dealing with those various patents now have a “very
important tool to fight back by invalidating those patents.” 239 Moreover,
the ruling will “help prevent dubious patents from being granted in the
future” to patent trolls. 240
While the Supreme Court struck down abstract software patents, it
failed to define exactly what constitutes an “abstract idea.” 241 The
Supreme Court failed to even address what, if anything, about software
should be considered an “abstract idea.” 242 Justice Clarence Thomas,
writing for the majority, explained that the Court “need not labor to delimit
the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.” 243 By
failing to define an abstract idea, however, the Court left the door open for
patents trolls to prey on this ambiguity. The White House’s Council of
Economic Advisors Report previously mentioned found that “a key factor
in the rise of patent assertion by non-practicing entities . . . was a change in
law or technology that led to uncertainty about whether a patent had been
infringed.” 244 The Supreme Court’s failure to define “abstract” in Alice
Corp. will leave a product-producing company unable to determine if a
NPE’s patents are valid, causing the company not to risk litigation. The
Alice Corp. decision, therefore, created an effect opposite to that intended
by the Supreme Court. Moreover, product-producing software companies
are now left wondering if their patents are even valid. For Google, Oracle,
and Microsoft, over half of their patent portfolios are software based. 245

238. Klint Finley, Supreme Court Deals Major Blow to Patent Trolls, WIRED (June 19,
2014, 3:48 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/supreme-court-deals-major-blow-to-patenttrolls/.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See generally Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347.
242. See generally id.
243. Id. at 2357.
244. Executive Office of the President, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 13
(2014).
245. Joff Wild, Big US Tech Companies Face Major Patent Losses in the Post-Alice
(Sept.
14,
2014),
http://www.iamWorld,
IAM
Research
Reveals,
IAM
magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=2028b324-2d4a-4523-9f0d-f0773b8b3fa1.
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With the ruling in Alice Corp., hundreds of thousands of software patents
are potentially at risk. The rulings in Octane and Highmark, however, do
not pose these issues because they attack the plaintiff’s purpose for
bringing the claim and not the underlying nature of the patent. Therefore,
Octane and Highmark serve as a better solution than Alice Corp..
C. The Bonding Requirement
Although Octane and Highmark currently pose a critical threat to
patent trolls, an additional bonding requirement would supply a
complimentary solution to these two decisions that would effectively end
NPE litigation. A bonding requirement would require a plaintiff to post a
bond before bringing a patent infringement claim. 246 This requirement
would force a NPE plaintiff to carefully consider the merits of their claim
rather than filing for nuisance purposes.247 Moreover, a bonding
requirement would solve the problem of patent trolls functioning as shell
corporations, which are often set up by patent trolls to avoid paying a
judgment. 248 In the event of an unfavorable judgment, a patent troll simply
declares bankruptcy and vanishes, leaving the defendant “emptyhanded.” 249 With a bonding requirement, however, a defendant would still
be rightfully paid.
Bonding requirements have also been effectively imposed in other
legal fields. 250 Under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
movant must post a bond before a court can issue a preliminarily injunction
or temporary restraining order against the party to be enjoined. 251 The
purpose, much like in the context of patent litigation, is to ensure that the
enjoined party receives compensation to cover the costs and damages in the
event the court later rules an injunction was not proper.252 Along with a
246. Emily H. Chen, Note, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting
Attorneys’ Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 380 (2013).
247. Id.
248. Gary Shapiro, Senate Should Finish Off The Patent Trolls, THE HILL (Mar. 26, 2014,
11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/201701-senate-should-finish-offthe-patent-trolls.
249. Id.
250. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
251. Id.
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remedial benefit, a bonding requirement would force abusive NPEs to “put
some skin in the game.” 253
Congress has also embraced the benefits of a bonding requirement
with its revision of the SHIELD Act. 254 In 2013, U.S. Representatives
Jason Chaffetz and Peter DeFazio introduced a revision of the SHIELD
Act, which included a “carefully drafted” bonding requirement. 255 Only
time will tell, however, if the Act becomes reality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Abusive patent litigation brought by patent trolls poses a serious
threat to our economy. Not only do the actions of patent trolls result in
billions of dollars of lost wealth, this lost wealth reduces spending on
innovative technology. 256 Moreover, these patent trolls use valuable court
resources to litigate claims that are statically proven to lose.257 Fortunately,
the Supreme Court has decided to challenge this looming threat and fight
back with their decision in Octane and Highmark. Not only do Octane and
Highmark make it easier for district court judges to award attorney’s fees
against patent trolls, they do so without the residual ramifications observed
in Alice Corp. and the Innovation Act. Coupled with a bonding
requirement, product-producing companies, both large and small, will send
patent trolls back under the bridge and keep them a creature of fairytales.

252. Tom Long, Remember Bonds on Preliminary Injunctions, NOSSAMAN LLP (Nov.
30,
2014),
http://www.nossamanlitigationadvocates.com/2014/11/remember-bonds-onpreliminary-injunctions/.
253. Chen, supra note 246, at 381.
254. See SAVING HIGH-TECH INNOVATORS FROM EGREGIOUS LEGAL DISPUTES ACT OF
2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
255. Daniel Roth, Patent Litigation Attorneys’ Fees: Shifting from Status to Conduct, 13
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 257, 269 (2013).
256. See WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION AND THE
SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 27 (The Indep. Inst. 2013).
257. Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 693 (2012).

